This article explores the asymptotic complexity of two problems related to the Miller-Rabin-Selfridge primality test. The first problem is to tabulate strong pseudoprimes to a single fixed base a. It is now proven that tabulating up to x requires O(x) arithmetic operations and O(x log x) bits of space. The second problem is to find all strong liars and witnesses, given a fixed odd composite n. This appears to be unstudied, and a randomized algorithm is presented that requires an expected O((log n) 2 + |S(n)|) operations (here S(n) is the set of strong liars). Although interesting in their own right, a notable application is the search for sets of composites with no reliable witnesses. 
INTRODUCTION
A common way to prove that a positive integer n is composite is to demonstrate that a necessary condition for primality fails. For example, by Fermat's Theorem, we know that if p is prime and a is not divisible by p, then a p−1 ≡ 1 mod p. The converse of Fermat's Theorem fails, inspiring the following definition. Definition 1.1. Let n be a positive, composite integer. If a n−1 ≡ 1 mod n, we call a a Fermat liar with respect to n, and we call n a Fermat a-pseudoprime or a-psp for short. If a ≡ 0 mod n and a n−1 ≡ 1 mod n, then a is a Fermat witness for n. If a ≡ 0 mod n, then a is neither a witness nor a liar.
Due to the existence of composite numbers with many Fermat liars, a stronger condition was developed by Selfridge, Miller, Rabin, and others. Let n > 1 be odd, and write n − 1 as 2 s d where d is odd. Then, if n is prime and gcd(a, n) = 1, either
(1) a d ≡ 1 mod n, or (2) a 2 i d ≡ −1 mod n for some 0 ≤ i ≤ s − 1.
We call this the strong pseudoprime condition. An algorithm built around this condition is known as the Miller-Rabin-Selfridge test, and it inspires a similar definition of liar. Definition 1.2. Let n be an odd, positive, composite integer. If a satisfies the strong pseudoprime condition, we call a a strong liar with respect to n, and we call n a strong a-pseudoprime or a-spsp for short. If a ≡ 0 mod n and a does not satisfy the condition, then a is a strong witness for n.
If a ≡ 0 mod n, then a is neither a strong witness nor a strong liar.
Note that 1 and n − 1 are strong liars for any odd composite n. Excluding the case when gcd(a, n) = n, if gcd(a, n) = 1, then a must be a strong witness. Since 1, −1 are units modulo n and a is not, no power of a could result in 1 or −1 modulo n.
If n is fixed, we denote the set of Fermat liars by F(n) and the set of strong liars by S(n). These are subsets of the set of residues modulo n. From Monier [1980] , we have exact formulae for the size of these sets, namely,
where ω(n) is the number of distinct primes dividing n, ν = min p|n ν 2 ( p − 1), and n is the odd part of n − 1. This article will focus on the asymptotic complexity of two tabulation problems related to strong liars. First, given a fixed a, tabulate all a-spsp up to a given bound x. Second, given a fixed odd composite n, determine all 1 ≤ a < n for which a is a strong liar. While many authors have performed pseudoprime searches or pseudoprime tabulations (especially pseudoprimes to multiple bases), fewer analyze algorithms for these problems in terms of their asymptotic complexity. In fact, the literature seems to lack algorithms for tabulating strong witnesses and liars. The naive complexity to beat is that of simply applying the strong pseudoprime condition, either to each odd composite up to x or to each potential liar a. This method requires the equivalent of a single modular exponentiation for each integer, which totals to O(x log x) multiplications.
There has been interest in tabulating pseudoprimes since a variety of primality tests were first developed. A significant piece of prior work is Pomerance et al. [1980] , which contains a tabulation of 2-Fermat pseudoprimes up to 25 · 10 9 . The key algorithmic idea was to restrict the search to certain equivalence classes. In particular, if n is a 2-psp with p | n, then 2 ( p) | n − 1 (here a ( p) is defined as the multiplicative order of a modulo p). This tabulation was extended to 10 13 in Pinch [2000] . Pinch added a precomputation that matched integers f with all primes q such that a (q) = f , then looped over preproducts P, factors f of P − 1, and primes q with a (q) = f in search of pseudoprimes Pq. A method similar to Pinch's has been used to tabulate all 2-psp up to 2 64 − 1 [Feitsma 2013] . One contribution of the present work is demonstrating that a (q) can be computed for all prime powers q ≤ x at a cost of O(x) multiplications. Other tabulations have focused on the search for ψ k , defined as the smallest composite that is a strong pseudoprime to all of the first k prime bases. The resulting specialized algorithms take advantage of the fact that pseudoprimes to several bases fall into an even more restricted set of congruence classes. Jaeschke [1993] utilized this technique to tabulate n ≤ 10 12 that are simultaneously 2-spsp, 3-spsp, and 5-spsp. Zhang [2007] further restricted the search to pseudoprimes with two prime factors related by a single parameter, finding all such pseudoprimes to 10 36 . In the process, upper bounds or exact values were given for ψ k with k ≤ 19. Jiang and Deng [2014] tabulated pseudoprimes to the first eight prime bases and provably determined ψ 11 . An algorithm developed in Bleichenbacher [1996] tabulates pseudoprimes to two or more bases up to x and has a heuristic complexity of O(x 9/11+o(1) ). Recently, Sorenson and Webster improved this to O(x 2/3+o(1) ) and computed ψ 12 and ψ 13 [Sorenson and Webster 2015] .
Two main results will be discussed in later sections. First, an algorithm is presented in Section 5 that returns all a-spsp up to x. For the first time it is proven that tabulating strong pseudoprimes to a single fixed base a requires O(x) arithmetic operations and O(x log x) bits of space. The second new result is an algorithm that tabulates all strong liars for a given odd composite n in factored form. Presented as Theorem 7.2 in Section 7, we first use a randomized algorithm to compute the structure of F(n) at an expected cost of O((log n) 2 ) operations, after which tabulating S(n) requires O(|S(n)|) operations.
NOTATION AND MODEL OF COMPUTATION
For a in the unit group (Z/nZ) × , a (n) will denote the multiplicative order of a modulo n. That is, a (n) is the least integer e such that a e ≡ 1 mod n. By Lagrange's Theorem,
The largest power of p that divides n will be notated by p ν p (n) . Note that one way to compute a (n) is to compute ν p ( a (n)) for all primes p dividing φ(n). The number of distinct prime factors of an integer n is denoted ω(n) and the largest prime factor of n by P(n).
In this article, log will stand for the natural logarithm, though log 2 (the base 2 logarithm) will occasionally be used in describing algorithms.
The computational model used assumes all arithmetic operations take constant time, though the space complexity of algorithms will always be measured in bits. In particular, if x is the bound on the tabulation being performed, all integers considered have O(log x) bit size, and we assume arithmetic operations on such integers take constant time. See Dunten et al. [1996, Section 2] for further details and justification.
RELIABLE WITNESSES
The inspiration for the present work comes from a question posed in Alford et al. [1994a] : find the smallest integer x for which there is no reliable strong witness for the set of odd composites up to x. This seems difficult, but if we change the problem to "no reliable witness less than or equal to x," it becomes more tractable.
Definition 3.1. Let C be a set of composite integers. We call positive integer a a reliable Fermat witness for C if it is a Fermat witness for every composite n ∈ C. We similarly define reliable strong witness and use simply "reliable witness" if the test is clear from context. A little computation reveals that the answer to the modified question is 2,047. The first 2-spsp is 2,047, so 2 is a reliable witness for the odd composites less than 2,047. Looking at a < 2,047, the smallest a-spsp is always smaller than 2,047, except for the fact that the smallest 1,320-spsp is 4,097. However, 1,320 is not a reliable witness, because it has odd composite divisors. For such an odd composite divisor n, we have 1,320 ≡ 0 mod n and thus 1,320 is neither a witness nor a liar. We conclude that the odd composites up to 2,047 have no reliable witness ≤ 2,047, and that x = 2,047 is the smallest bound with that property.
A natural extension is to construct a small set of odd composites ≤ x with no reliable witness ≤ x for arbitrary x. By the work of Monier [1980] and others, we know that the maximum number of strong liars a composite n can possess is φ(n)/4. By using n that reach the maximum, we should have a set of composites with few reliable witnesses. For each such reliable witness a, add the smallest a-spsp until the set no longer has a reliable witness. Note that implementing this construction requires algorithms for the two problems under consideration, namely, tabulating all a-spsp up to a given bound x and determining all 1 ≤ a < n for which a is a strong liar.
There are known theoretical bounds on the count of a-pseudoprimes up to x, denoted by P a (x). Since every Carmichael number relatively prime to a is an a-pseudoprime, Alford et al. [1994b] give a lower bound of x 2/7 . Combined with an upper bound from Pomerance [1981] , we have
for large enough x. Useful theoretical results are also available on counts of Fermat liars and strong liars (here we restrict to liars a with 1 ≤ a ≤ n− 1). Carmichael numbers are composite integers n that are a-psp for all a relatively prime to n. Thus, by Alford et al. [1994b] , there are infinitely many composite n with φ(n) Fermat liars. The size of φ(n) depends on how many prime factors n possesses. For each fixed k, there are infinitely many Carmichael numbers n with no prime factor below (log n) k . For such n, the probability that gcd(a, n) = 1 is at most (log n) −k+1 , where 1 ≤ a ≤ n − 1 is chosen uniformly at random [Alford et al. 1994a, Section 2] . See Granville and Pomerance [2002] for more results and conjectures on counts of Carmichael numbers with a specified number of prime factors. Bounds on the normal order and average order of the set of strong liars can be found in Erdős and Pomerance [1986] .
Related to reliable witnesses is the notion of the least strong witness for an odd composite n, denoted W(n). Making explicit a result of Miller, Bach [1990] showed that W(n) < 2(log n) 2 under the Extended Riemann Hypothesis. For a lower bound,
1/(3 log log log n) for infinitely many Carmichael numbers n [Alford et al. 1994a] . More generally, the authors showed that for x sufficiently large and for any set of potential witnesses not too large, there are Carmichael numbers smaller than x with no witness in the set. Thus, asymptotically, there cannot be a reliable witness for the set of odd composites up to x.
PRELIMINARIES
The algorithms developed in later sections will require access to the factorization of any integer in a given range. The goal is to create an array that stores in position i the smallest prime factor of i. Then, one can retrieve the full factorization of any n with O(log n) division steps through finding the prime factor p and recursively finding the smallest prime factor of n/ p.
A factor table for integers up to x can be created with O(x log log x) arithmetic operations using the Sieve of Eratosthenes [Crandall and Pomerance 2001, Section 3.2.3] . There is extensive literature on linear and sublinear prime sieves one can turn to for an improvement [Dunten et al. 1996; Pritchard 1982 Pritchard , 1987 ; the following lemma only adds the idea of a static wheel to the Sieve of Eratosthenes.
LEMMA 4.1. Given a bound x, there exists an algorithm that outputs an array A of size x that contains at position i the smallest prime factor of i. This algorithm requires O(x) arithmetic operations and O(x log x) bits of space.
PROOF. For an introduction to the wheel data structure, see Dunten et al. [1996, Section 2] . In our case, in addition to storing the distance to the next integer relatively prime to the first k primes, we need to compute and store the smallest prime factor for the integers up to the wheel size m = k i=1 p i that are divisible by one of the first k primes. If we pick k so that
x, this can be done using the Sieve of Eratosthenes in time O( √ x log log log x) or even in time O( √ x) [Dunten et al. 1996 , Lemma 1]. Let array W store the distance to the next relatively prime integer and array R store the smallest prime factor for integers up to m. Now, as a first step, for each i < n, set
As a second step, for each prime p > p k , and for each f relatively prime to m, set A[ pf ] = p if p is smaller than the previous entry of A [ pf ] . This algorithm is correct, since if the smallest prime factor of i is p ≤ p k , then p is also the smallest prime factor of i mod m. If the smallest prime factor of i is greater than p k , it is caught in Step 2.
Step 1 requires O(x) arithmetic operations.
Step 2 uses the wheel to step through the integers relatively prime to m in linear time. The number of such integers is [Bach and Shallit 1996, Theorem 8.8.6 ] and so the cost of Step 2 in operations is [Bach and Shallit 1996, Theorem 8.8.5] .
In what follows, we will assume that such an algorithm has been run, and hence that we have access to any prime factorization.
To apply sieve techniques, we need a characterization of strong pseudoprimes that depends on properties of their prime factors. This first proposition shows that strong pseudoprimes are not much harder to identify than Fermat pseudoprimes.
PROPOSITION 4.2 (ALFORD ET AL. [1994A]). Let n be a positive, odd composite integer. Then n is a strong pseudoprime to the base a if and only if a
n−1 ≡ 1 mod n and there exists an integer e such that, for every prime factor p of n, ν 2 ( a ( p)) = e.
We now extend the idea in Pomerance et al. [1980] , characterizing a Fermat pseudoprime n by the prime powers that divide it. This gives a restricted set of equivalence classes to which pseudoprimes belong. 
) and so a ( p r ) divides n − 1.
We will need to compute a ( p r ) for all prime powers p r up to x. With access to the factorization of φ( p r ), the preferred algorithm is a known method that determines the power of each prime dividing the order [Menezes et al. 1997, Algorithm 4.79] .
As Sutherland [2007, Section 7 .3] notes, line 2 in Algorithm 1 requires w exponentiations, while line 3 requires O(log n) multiplications over the entire loop. Since we (1 + o(1)) log 2 N log 2 log 2 N group operations.
As a corollary, the asymptotic running time of Algorithm 1 is
log n log log n multiplications.
Next, it is necessary to know how many distinct prime factors φ( p r ) = p r−1 ( p − 1) has on average. LEMMA 4.6. The following sum is over prime powers. We have
PROOF. From Halberstam [1956] , we know that 
which is asymptotically smaller. This completes the proof.
COMPUTING A-PSEUDOPRIMES
This section presents a new algorithm for finding all a-spsp up to a bound x. Pomerance et al. [1980] Note that on average the number of distinct prime factors of n is O(log log n), and so a worst-case analysis of the loop in line 12 would be O(x log log x) operations. The success of this algorithm depends on the fact that most composites are not pseudoprimes, and that nonpseudoprimes will be discovered rather rapidly, so that on average only a constant number of factors need to be checked before an obstruction to a composite integer's pseudoprimality is found. The author is grateful to Jonathan Sorenson for this insight. Factor φ(q) using array from line 1;
9
Compute a (q) using Algorithm 1;
for n = 2 to x with P[n] == 1 do 11
Set q = p r to be the prime power dividing n with smallest p; 
. Given base a and bound x, Algorithm 2 correctly computes all a-spsp up to x. The algorithm has a time complexity of O(x) arithmetic operations and requires O(x log x) bits of space.
PROOF. In lines 4 and 5, the algorithm discards cases where n is prime, n is even, or a is not a unit modulo n. If n fails Proposition 4.3 and is thus not a Fermat pseudoprime, it is caught at line 14, while at line 16 we catch composites that are Fermat pseudoprimes but not strong pseudoprimes. Thus, if Algorithm 2 sets P[n] = 0, n is indeed not a strong pseudoprime.
Conversely, if P[n] = 1 at the end of the algorithm, then n is a strong pseudoprime to the base a. If n has passed the line 12 while loop, then a ( p r ) | n − 1 for all prime powers p r dividing n, making n an a-psp by Proposition 4.3. Since P[n] = 1, we know that n also passed the strong pseudoprime test at line 16.
For complexity, line 1 requires O(x) operations and O(x log x) space. As noted, Algorithm 1 factors n and computes a (n) using O(log n+ω(n) log n/ log log n) multiplications. By applying Lemma 4.6, we calculate the total cost in multiplications of all order computations as
Note that q≤x 1 = O(x/ log x) and that q is a prime power.
Focusing now on line 12, finding the next prime power dividing n and testing a congruence are both single operations. The while loop will end as soon as the algorithm encounters a prime power q dividing n such that n ≡ 1 mod a (q). An upper bound on the number of iterations needed is the count of all prime powers q | n such that n ≡ 1 mod a (q). We define α(n) as this count, so that an upper bound on the complexity of lines 10 to 12 is n≤x α(n) + O(1).
Reversing the order of summation, we see that
By Proposition 4.4, if gcd(q, a (q)) = 1, there are no integers n such that q is the power of p exactly dividing n and n ≡ 1 mod a (q), while if gcd(q, a (q)) = 1, then such n are exactly those in the arithmetic progression n ≡ q mod q · a (q). Thus, Finally, the strong test at line 16 is only performed on Fermat pseudoprimes. Since there are at most x/ exp(log x · log log log x/ log log x) Fermat pseudoprimes up to x [Pomerance 1981] 
and the strong test takes O(log x) operations, the total is O(x)
operations.
An alternate method of sieving for Fermat pseudoprimes is given in Pinch [2000, Section 7] . Initialize a table of real numbers indexed by integers, and for each prime p, add log p to the entries in the arithmetic progression n ≡ p mod p a ( p). Then n is a pseudoprime if the total at the end of sieving is log n.
FINDING PRIMITIVE ROOTS AND TABULATING FERMAT LIARS
Rather than fixing a and looking for n that are a-pseudoprimes, we next fix a composite n and ask for all a that are liars (or witnesses) for n. It is sufficient to restrict the tabulation to 1 ≤ a < n, since by definition a is a liar for n if (a mod n) is a liar.
Throughout the next two sections, we assume n is a positive, odd, composite integer and that the factorizations of both n and φ(n) are given. Let n = q 1 · · · q k , where q i = p r i i with p i prime. Our strategy will be to first show how to find primitive roots modulo q i , and then demonstrate how to tabulate the elements of (Z/nZ) × of order dividing f , where f is an arbitrary positive integer. This solves the problem of tabulating the set of Fermat liars F(n), but the situation with the set of strong liars is different since S(n) is not generally a subgroup. In the next section, we overcome this obstruction through the use of Proposition 4.2. In some sense, S(n) is "almost" a subgroup of the group of units.
It is well known that for prime power q, (Z/qZ) × is cyclic. A generator is called a primitive root. Finding a primitive root is in general a hard problem, but with factorizations of n, φ(n) on hand, there is a straightforward strategy. Take a subset S of (Z/qZ). For each s ∈ S, compute s (q) using Algorithm 1. If it equals φ(q), we know s is a primitive root. The remaining difficulty comes from choosing a small S that contains a primitive root.
We will consider two straightforward methods. One good method is to simply check all integers up to some bound. Define g( p) to be the smallest positive integer that is a primitive root modulo p. Burgess [1962] and Wang [1959] proved independently that g( p) = O( p 1/4+ ). The best explicit result is that g( p) < p 0.499 for p − 1 ≥ exp(exp(24)) [Grosswald 1981] . Under the assumption of the Extended Riemann Hypothesis, we have the stronger result that g( p) = O((log p) 6 ) [Shoup 1992 ]. If g is a primitive root modulo a prime p, the following lemma makes it easy to find a primitive root modulo a prime power p r .
LEMMA 6.1. Let p be an odd prime.
( PROOF. See Apostol [1976, Section 10.6 ].
An alternative method is to simply choose residues at random. From group theory, we know that a cyclic group of order m has φ(m) generators, and thus the probability of choosing a generator with a single trial is φ(m)/m. We have the following lemma.
LEMMA 6.2 (MONTGOMERY AND VAUGHAN [2007] , THEOREM 2.9). For all n ≥ 3,
where c is a known absolute constant.
The probability of choosing a primitive root with a single trial is then
So a primitive root modulo q will be found after an expected O(log log q) trial. With this work, we can construct a basis of (Z/nZ) × , which we modify to form a basis for the subgroup of elements of order dividing f . Denote that subgroup by H f . Definition 6.3. A tuple g = [g 1 , . . . , g k ] will be called a basis for a finite abelian group G if every b ∈ G can be expressed uniquely as
Suppose G = C m 1 × · · · × C m k is a finite abelian group written as a direct product of cyclic groups, with g i a generator for C m i . Then we writeĝ i = (1, 1, . . . , g i , . . . , 1) , where the nonidentity element occurs at the ith place in the tuple. Note that by the theory of direct product groups, {ĝ i } forms a basis for G.
where each C m i is a cyclic group with generator g i . Then a basis for H f is {ĝ
, and note that (g Algorithm 3 applies these ideas to compute the structure of the subgroup H f of (Z/nZ) × . We find primitive roots modulo q for each prime power q dividing n, use them to create a basis for (Z/nZ) × , then modify them to create a basis for H f . 
Use the Chinese Remainder Theorem to findĝ i such thatĝ i ≡ 1 mod q j for j = i and g i ≡ g mod q j for j = i; /* Now modify {ĝ i } to be a basis for H f .
*
THEOREM 6.5. Algorithm 3 correctly computes the structure of the subgroup H f of
given n and φ(n) in factored form. If primitive root candidates are chosen uniformly at random from the residues modulo p i , Algorithm 3 has an expected complexity of O((log n)
2 ) operations.
PROOF. Line 2 will eventually result in primitive roots being found modulo p i for each prime dividing n. Then, by Lemma 6.1, line 3 finishes with g a primitive root modulo q i = p r 1 i . The Chinese Remainder Theorem is then used to construct a basis for the product group C φ(q 1 ) × · · · × C φ(q k ) . By Proposition 6.4, raising these elements to powers x i = φ(q i )/ gcd(φ(q i ), f ) results in a basis for H f .
For complexity, the length of time needed to find a primitive root depends on the method used and whether we assume the Extended Riemann Hypothesis. Let |S p | be the number of trials before a primitive root modulo p is found. Algorithm 1 has complexity O(log p + ω( p − 1) log p log log p ), while the Chinese Remainder Theorem takes O((log n) 2 ) bit operations or O(log n) ring operations [Bach and Shallit 1996, Corollary 5.5.3] . So the complexity in ring operations of the loop at line 1 is
If we choose S p at random, its expected size is O(log log p). Note that
and so the complexity of the loop at line 1 is an expected O((log n) 2 ). At line 7, k = O(log n), and for each 1 ≤ i ≤ k, we do a gcd, a division, and an exponentiation, which takes O(log n) multiplications. The total cost of this step is thus O((log n)
2 ) operations as well.
If we would prefer a deterministic algorithm, the complexity is greater. Assuming the Extended Riemann Hypothesis, we have
while unconditionally this is instead
where P(n) is the largest prime factor of n. Once the structure of H f is computed, tabulating the elements involves generating (ĝ 1 t 1 , . . . ,ĝ k t k ) for each tuple t = (t 1 , . . . , t k ) with 0 ≤ t i < gcd(φ(q i ), f ). If we prefer the elements to be integers, we can update an integer value as we cycle. So if the power of g i is incremented by one, the stored integer is multiplied byĝ i modulo n.
As a corollary, this gives us a sublinear time algorithm for tabulating Fermat liars.
COROLLARY 6.6. Assume n and φ(n) are given in factored form. Tabulating F(n) requires at most O(P(n) 1/4+ + n 1/8+ + |F(n)|) operations deterministically, or an expected O((log n) 2 + |F(n)|) operations if using a randomized method for generating primitive roots modulo p.
PROOF. Apply Algorithm 3 with f = n − 1 to compute the structure, and then cycle through all the elements.
In fact, since elements of (Z/nZ) × have order dividing φ(n), we could compute F(n) by instead taking f = gcd(n − 1, φ(n)). This observation was made to the author by Noah Lebowitz-Lockard.
TABULATING STRONG LIARS
The set of strong liars does not form a group, since if ν 2 ( a ( p)) = ν 2 ( b ( p)), then ν 2 ( ab ( p)) might not have the same value. Instead, we explicitly characterize the subset of F(n) with ν 2 ( a ( p)) equal for all p | n. After precomputation, tabulating S(n) will require exactly |S(n)| operations. The author is grateful to an anonymous referee for providing the key idea of this section, improving upon the original algorithm.
We continue to assume n is odd, and that the factorizations of n and φ(n) are known. Specifically, let n = q 1 · · · q k . Let {ĝ} be the basis for F(n) computed by Algorithm 3. Recall thatĝ i = g 
Now consider an arbitrary a ∈ F(n). Since the order ofĝ i is gcd(n − 1, p i − 1), the power of 2 dividing a ( p i ) is at most v( p i ). Thus, if a n−1 ≡ 1 mod n and ν 2 ( a ( p)) = e for all p | n, we must have e ≤ min p|n v( p). PROPOSITION 7.1. The set of a ∈ (Z/ p r Z) × with a ∈ F(n) and ν 2 ( a ( p r )) = ν 2 ( a ( p)) = e is given by v( p) . If e = 0, the set is instead the subgroup generated byĝ
PROOF. The group we are working with is cyclic, so we again use Proposition 6.4 to characterize the subgroup of elements that are Fermat liars and whose order divides 
Then Algorithm 4 correctly returns S(n). Computing the structure of F(n) takes O(P(n)
1/4+ + n 1/8+ ) operations deterministically or an expected O((log n) 2 ) operations using a randomized algorithm, after which tabulating S(n) requires O(|S(n)|) operations.
PROOF. By Theorem 6.5, Algorithm 3 correctly returns a basis for F(n). Thus, every element a constructed during the cycle is a Fermat liar.
By Proposition 7.1,ĝ i t i with t i ≡ 2 v( p i )−e mod 2 v( p i )−e+1 creates all a i ∈ (Z/q i Z) × with ν 2 ( a i (q i )) = e if e > 0 and lines 2 to 3 accomplish the same task in the e = 0 case. Then ν 2 ( a ( p)) = e for all p | n if and only if a = (a 1 , . . . a k ) in (Z/nZ) × . By Proposition 4.2, ν 2 ( a ( p)) = e for some e and for all p | n if and only if a is a strong liar for n. If e > min i v( p i ), we cannot have a n−1 ≡ 1 mod n and ν 2 ( a ( p i )) = e for some i. Thus, by looping over all 0 ≤ e ≤ min i v( p i ), we generate all strong liars for n.
Line 1 takes O(P(n) 1/4+ + n 1/8+ ) operations deterministically or an expected O((log n)
2 ) by Theorem 6.5. The precomputation on line 6 requires
operations. Once the precomputation is complete, incrementing t i by one step means multiplying byĝ i
mod n, which is only a single operation.
CONCLUSIONS
We have shown that tabulating all a-spsp up to x requires linear time in the Big-Oh sense, as does tabulating all strong liars for a given odd composite n. The literature on prime sieving suggests a host of potential improvements, including wheel data structures, segmentation to save space, sieving in parallel computing models, and their combinations. Any or all of these might apply to the problems of tabulating pseudoprimes and liars. In particular, using a wheel data structure would certainly speed up the tabulation of pseudoprimes [Pritchard 1982 ], though analyzing the gain asymptotically is challenging. Perhaps the most promising route to achieving sublinear complexity for tabulating a-spsp lies in analyzing the algorithm laid out in Pinch [2000] .
